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ABSTRACT
As climate movements are growing around the world, so too is a postapocalyptic 
form of environmentalism. While apocalyptic environmentalism warns of future 
catastrophe in case of inaction, its postapocalyptic sibling assumes that cata-
strophe is already here or unavoidable. Here I explore the overlooked strategic 
implications of postapocalyptic narratives in climate change movements. 
I present data from a qualitative study of climate activism in five European cities: 
Malmö, Hamburg, Antwerp, Bristol, and Manchester, based on ethnographic 
observations and 46 qualitative interviews. I argue that postapocalyptic narratives 
are indeed widely present but are, following the logics of appropriateness, habit 
and affect, kept out of strategizing; in turn, this enables a continued focus on 
climate mitigation. Debates about the need for strategies to adapt to present or 
unavoidable climate disruptions tend to be foreclosed, though exceptions like 
the co-creation of local adaptation measures are discussed.
KEYWORDS Climate change movements; postapocalyptic environmentalism; climate mitigation; cli-
mate adaptation
Introduction
For more than two decades, climate change movements (CCMs) have been 
organizing to promote and demand scientifically sound and socially just 
responses to the climate crisis, demanding in particular that governments 
take action to mitigate climate change. Since late 2018, new campaigns like 
Fridays For Future and Extinction Rebellion have brought millions more to 
the streets (de Moor et al. 2020). Yet while demands for climate action are 
increasing, so too seems to be a realization that we are beyond the point 
where climate change can simply be ‘solved’ (Stuart 2020, Friberg 2021). 
Indeed, many societies are already experiencing considerable disruption, and 
both popular and scientific discourses increasingly acknowledge that climate 
change will cause significant further disruption in the decades ahead – even 
in the most optimistic scenarios (IPCC 2021). Some argue that we are 
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consequently witnessing a shift from ‘apocalyptic’ to ‘postapocalyptic’ envir-
onmentalism. While the former portrays ecological crises as looming on the 
horizon, the latter describes the spread of ‘environmental activism based on 
a catastrophic loss experienced as already having occurred, as ongoing or as 
impossible to prevent, rather than as a future risk or threat’ (Cassegård and 
Thörn 2018, p. 563).
The strategic impacts of such a shift could be profound, potentially 
shifting debates to coping with, rather than preventing, environmental crises. 
However, few have analysed the place and impact of the postapocalyptic turn 
in today’s CCMs. Looking at five north-western European cities (Malmö, 
Hamburg, Antwerp, Bristol, and Manchester), I therefore ask: How do 
climate activists relate to the idea of apocalyptic and postapocalyptic envir-
onmentalism, and how does the presumed spread of postapocalyptic envir-
onmentalism affect their goals and strategies? My analysis proceeds in three 
parts. First, I explore the nature and place of postapocalyptic narratives in the 
five studied CCM scenes. Second, I analyse how the sense that it might be too 
late to stay within ‘safe’ limits of climate change affects campaigns to demand 
climate mitigation. Specifically, I examine whether postapocalyptic environ-
mentalism undermines this work by painting mitigation as a lost cause, or 
whether there are mechanisms that shield it from such an impact. Third, 
I examine whether postapocalyptic environmentalism might introduce new 
goals or strategies. In particular, I explore whether postapocalyptic narratives 
increase the focus of activism on adaptation in response to unavoidable 
climate impacts.
In what follows, I therefore discuss the emergence of postapocalyptic 
environmentalism in CCMs, before outlining my research design and meth-
odology. I then present my empirical findings and discuss their principal 
implications.
Postapocalyptic environmentalism in climate change movements
Backed up by climate science on a rapidly closing window to prevent 
a ‘Hothouse Earth’ in which ‘a cascade of feedbacks’ irreversibly accelerates 
climate change (Steffen et al. 2018), climate activists have long maintained 
a ‘now or never’ message on climate action (Kenis and Mathijs 2014, de 
Moor and Wahlström 2019). Yet climate activism has repeatedly been 
unable to force sufficient climate policy action; consequently, it has had 
to find ways to continue campaigning despite its earlier warnings that time 
had run out. In particular the mobilization around the 2009 COP15 
Climate Summit in Copenhagen has been depicted as a traumatic moment 
for climate activism (Fisher 2010). Movement framings of COP15 as the 
last chance to effectively mitigate climate change brought record numbers 
of activists to the streets, but the Summit’s failure to deliver was highly 
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demobilizing (Hadden 2015); not until the run up to the 2015 COP21 
Climate Summit in Paris did CCMs regain their strength (Cassegård et al. 
2017). The Paris mobilization had learned from Copenhagen by focusing 
on expectation management: COP21 was an important moment for climate 
politics, but it was not the most important, let alone last, moment to save 
the planet. Rather, it was framed as a stepping-stone for movements that 
would subsequently force effective climate action by taking matters into 
their own hands (de Moor 2018, de Moor and Wahlström 2019). However, 
in the most recent global climate campaigns led by Fridays For Future 
(FFF) and Extinction Rebellion (XR), the ‘now or never’ message has been 
recentered, particularly in responding to the alarming 2018 IPCC report on 
the closing window for staying within the ‘safe’ limits of 1.5 degrees of 
global warming (de Moor et al. 2020).
The consequences of this history of centering and decentring the ‘now or 
never’ message for CCM goals and strategies has remained understudied, 
even though its impacts could be considerable. Indeed, we could expect that 
the continuous expiration of activists’ deadlines for meaningful action 
should alter, if not outright undermine, their ability to campaign, especially 
for mitigation. Only recently have authors like Cassegård and Thörn (2018) 
begun to address this gap by exploring an increasingly dominant postapo-
calyptic narrative in environmental movements. While climate activists in 
the Global North previously foregrounded an ‘apocalyptic’ framing of dis-
asters as immanent but therefore preventable, they now increasingly con-
ceive of the apocalypse as already present or unavoidable. Many 
communities in the Global South have long experienced environmental 
apocalypse (Whyte 2017). Now, after decades of disappointing climate pol-
itics, and with climate disruptions becoming noticeable even in more privi-
leged parts of the world, postapocalyptic narratives are also becoming central 
among CCM groups based in the Global North (Cassegård and Thörn 2018, 
Stuart 2020, Friberg 2021).
Though seemingly profound, we are only just beginning to explore the 
spread and implications of postapocalyptic environmentalism for climate 
activism. Until now, research has focused on the emotional impact the 
narrative has on climate activists. How activists deal with emotions like 
fear and hope(lessness) has received considerable attention (for an overview, 
Stuart 2020). Kleres and Wettergren (2017) argue for instance that in 
Northern CCMs, emotions like fear and hopelessness are widespread but 
seen as unproductive and are therefore managed through ‘feeling rules’ that 
prescribe how emotions should be handled in particular settings. By contrast, 
Cassegård and Thörn (2018) emphasize that postapocalyptic narratives are 
seen by some to produce hope through the acceptance of loss and the 
imagination of what is possible after the apocalypse. Likewise, Stuart 
(2020) found that XR activists in the UK increasingly recognize that severe 
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climate disruptions are inevitable, but derive from it a sense of ‘radical hope’ 
that focuses on ‘saving what can still be saved’ (p. 503).
Strategic implications of postapocalyptic environmentalism
While focused on emotions, these studies already point clearly to the poten-
tial strategic implications of postapocalyptic environmentalism. Yet research 
on this topic is relatively rare; deeper understanding is clearly needed if we 
consider that changes in a movement’s problem definition (e.g. from apoc-
alyptic to postapocalyptic) may change its perception of appropriate 
responses (Benford and Snow 2000). To address this possibility, we need to 
improve our understanding of the place of postapocalyptic environmental-
ism in CCMs, including whether it features in spaces of strategizing, and how 
it might be related to change as well as continuity in movement goals and the 
means used to pursue these goals. This overall goal I break down into three 
related aims.
My first aim is to get a better understanding of the nature and place of 
postapocalyptic environmentalism in CCMs. While Cassegård and Thörn 
(2018, p. 563) argue that ‘postapocalyptic discourse is both rooted in, and 
different from, apocalyptic imagination’, it is implied that postapocalyptic 
environmentalism increasingly replaces apocalyptic environmentalism. The 
authors argue that postapocalyptic environmentalism ‘breaks with the tem-
porality of progress as well as that of apocalyptic scenarios to be averted, 
instead evoking a temporality of continuous catastrophe’ (Cassegård and 
Thörn 2018, , p. 573). However, postapocalyptic environmentalism could 
complement rather than replace apocalyptic environmentalism in CCMs. 
For instance, activists may feel more optimistic at some times than others, 
inching towards or away from postapocalyptic perspectives, or they may feel 
that while some catastrophes are already here or underway, others can still be 
prevented. Still, apocalyptic and postapocalyptic narratives may also present 
contradictions – especially in terms of the kind of strategies each warrants 
and the emotions associated with them (e.g. optimism vs pessimism (Stuart 
2020)). Considering that social movements need clear, coherent narratives to 
inform their identities and courses of action (de Moor and Wahlström 2019), 
such contradictions must be managed. For instance, the postapocalyptic 
narrative might be kept out of strategic spaces, since hopelessness and fear 
may be seen as undermining mitigation-oriented climate action (Kleres and 
Wettergren 2017). Considering these possibilities, I address the need for 
an understanding of the exact nature and place of postapocalyptic narratives 
in CCMs.
My second aim is to assess how climate activism’s traditional focus on 
mitigation may be affected by the presumed spread of postapocalyptic 
environmentalism. Arguably, the sense that it is too late to meaningfully 
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mitigate climate change could undermine efforts towards that goal. 
According to Jasper (2006, p. 75), ‘We may opportunistically abandon earlier 
goals so as to increase our strategic capacities instead of continuing to deploy 
them in fruitless pursuit of our original goals.’ However, for the most part, 
CCM campaigns appear to continue focusing on mitigation (de Moor et al. 
2020, Stuart 2020). While this may suggest that the spread of postapocalyptic 
environmentalism is in fact quite limited, it could also indicate that its spread 
does not directly alter goals and strategies (Friberg 2021). I therefore address 
the need for a better understanding of the competing frames or mechanisms 
that could prevent it from affecting traditional movement focuses on 
mitigation.
My third aim is to explore what changes postapocalyptic environmental-
ism might cause in CCM goals and strategies, and in what ways it is limited 
from having such an impact. Even if the traditional focus on mitigation is not 
directly challenged by the spread of postapocalyptic environmentalism, it 
might still produce additional goals. Cassegård and Thörn (2018, p. 573) 
argue that ‘postapocalyptic narratives can be the wellspring of 
a postapocalyptic politics in which activism arises as a response to loss.’ 
They for instance describe how the Dark Mountain collective, which is best 
known for its artistic, self-titled edited volumes on topics like ‘restoration 
and renewal’ or ‘death, loss and renewal’, organizes ‘cultural activism (. . .) 
[that] is meant to facilitate a mental or cultural adaptation to loss rather than 
to prevent it.’ (Cassegård and Thörn 2018, p. 562–563). One main issue that 
postapocalyptic environmentalism could thus raise is how society should 
deal with those climate disruptions that are no longer considered avoidable. 
This is indeed what activist-scholar Jem Bendell has recently begun to 
promote in his call for ‘Deep Adaptation’:
Bold emissions cuts and carbon drawdown measures are still necessary to 
reduce as much as possible the mass extinction and human suffering of climate 
change, but we must also prepare for what is now inevitable [. . .] as we no 
longer assume that society as we know it can continue. (2019, p. 79)
Bendell’s call for a shift in focus to ‘preparation’ has become highly influential 
in some CCMs, with the above quote appearing in the XR handbook. It spells 
out a broad call for adaptation, including not just material interventions to 
alleviate specific climate risks, but also social, economic, political and cultural 
adaptation that radically restructures society in the face of futures character-
ized by climate disruptions. This view overlaps with the notion of ‘transforma-
tional adaptation,’ which goes beyond mainstream techno-managerial 
responses to specific climate risks, by seeking to redress fundamental drivers 
of climate vulnerability by focusing on social inequality (Pelling 2011). While 
each have distinct focuses, both approaches highlight the political and even 
contentious nature of climate adaptation, thereby painting a role for social 
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movements to engage with the topic (Zografos et al. 2020). The political nature 
of adaptation becomes especially clear when considering the significant cli-
mate justice implications adaptation can have (Schlosberg et al. 2017). Radical 
approaches like deep and transformational adaptation particularly object to 
the ways in which mainstream climate adaptation tends to overlook the needs 
and preferences of vulnerable communities by prioritizing economic and 
urban growth (Meerow and Mitchell 2017).
Given CCMs’ focus on shaping society’s long-term engagement with 
climate change, their increased focus on climate justice over the past decade 
and a half, as well as their current momentum, CCMs would seem to be 
among the prime candidates to politicize climate adaptation. Research 
focused outside Europe indeed indicates that movements ‘are turning 
increasingly to adaptative responses to a changing climate’ (Schlosberg 
2013, p. 47). Examples include mobilizations to demand climate justice in 
response to extreme weather events like hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 
(Bullard and Wright 2009, Dawson 2019), as well as engagement with 
adaptation in US environmental justice movements (Méndez 2020). 
However, it remains unclear what role adaptation plays in the more narrowly 
defined, self-identified CCMs that in recent years have become such vocal 
political actors – especially in Europe (de Moor et al. 2020). Thus, adaptation 
is deeply political, and broadly conceived, fits within CCM agendas to 
politicise climate change and advance climate justice. While 
a postapocalyptic perspective is certainly no precondition for engaging 
with adaptation, its spread could reinforce the importance of adaptation on 
movement agendas.
Explaining strategic responses beyond a logic of consequences
While not commonly used in social movement research, I will draw on 
March and Olsen's (1998) famous distinction between the logic of conse-
quences and the logic of appropriateness to explain strategic responses to 
postapocalyptic environmentalism. Developed in the literature on interna-
tional relations, the logic of consequences emphasizes how ‘human actors 
choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for per-
sonal or collective objectives’ (March and Olsen 1998, p. 949). The logic of 
appropriateness emphasizes how ‘action involves evoking an identity or role 
and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation’ 
(March and Olsen 1998, p. 951). While the former sees political action as 
instrumental behaviour, the latter underlines how politics involves identities 
that prescribe what actions are conceivable. While both logics have in 
common a degree of reflexivity, Hopf (2010) has added a ‘logic of habit’ 
which underlines that much strategic action involves the habitual repetition 
of well-established ways of doing. Finally, recent work by Markwica (2018) 
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stresses the logic of affect, which underlines how emotions can directly 
inform action, as well as inform the prioritization of logics of consequences 
or appropriateness, or of different goals or norms within them.
Being complementary, each of these logics helps explain varying 
responses to postapocalyptic environmentalism. Implicitly, a focus on the 
logic of consequences has been predominant in research on social move-
ments. Activists are often considered as instrumental actors who pursue 
strategies that maximize success within the confines of limited resources 
and opportunities (della Porta and Diani 2020). This approach would explain 
a straightforward change in goals and strategies in response to an emerging 
postapocalyptic narrative: as climate catastrophe becomes seen as unavoid-
able, a focus on adapting to its impacts becomes increasingly preferable. 
A logic of appropriateness could help explain how movements whose col-
lective identities have developed around a desire to stop climate change 
might be hesitant to adopt goals that deviate from these identities. Indeed, 
research shows how movement traditions determine what is considered 
appropriate, so that strategic decisions may be intentional but also con-
strained by the habitus of a group or movement (Doherty and Hayes 
2012). A logic of habit could explain a lack of change in goals and strategies 
by pointing to the unreflexive reproduction of strategy in CCMs, which may 
present the most efficient use of scarce resources. Finally, a logic of affect may 
help explain how emotional responses to postapocalyptic environmentalism 
could influence strategies. For instance, Markwica (2018) relates fear to 
inaction and hope to persistence, and furthermore stresses that the logic of 
affect interacts with the logic of appropriateness, thus resembling Kleres and 
Wettergren (2017) argument about feeling rules: how activists mobilize 
emotions is structured by the culture of the group. This could help explain 
why postapocalyptic narratives would be shunned from strategic spaces: by 
triggering emotions of hopelessness or fear, they could contradict the appro-
priateness of continuing to pursue mitigation. In the analysis, I will illustrate 
how these logics of action interact to shape CCMs’ strategies.
Research design and methods
I have taken a decidedly exploratory approach to provide one of the first 
analyses of the place and impact of postapocalyptic environmentalism on 
climate activism in north-western Europe. To find examples of strategic 
continuity and change, cities were chosen for their active CCM scenes and 
their exposure to climate impacts like flooding and urban heat, which 
I expected to increase the odds of postapocalyptic activism in response to 
such impacts. Thus, across four countries – Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and 
the UK – as many cities were selected: Malmö, Hamburg, Antwerp, and 
Bristol. I studied multiple cities, not to test comparative hypotheses, but to 
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increase diversity and the study’s exploratory reach. For instance, the four 
countries differ with regard to relevant policy-making processes (e.g. in 
relation to flooding), thereby increasing variation regarding contextual 
opportunities for movements to shape adaptation-related policies (e.g. 
Hegger et al. 2016). Additionally, I used data from a pilot study in 
Manchester (UK) (de Moor 2019). Considering that it followed 
a sufficiently similar methodological approach, I was able to integrate its 
findings.
I conducted qualitative interviews to get a detailed picture of the impact of 
postapocalyptic environmentalism in these cities’ CCM scenes, selecting 
interviewees with the aim of finding strategic continuity as well as change. 
Based on the assumption that by default I would find examples of strategic 
continuity because most climate activism appeared to remain focused on 
mitigation, I purposefully sampled groups that had adopted goals relating to 
adaptation. I first held interviews with local civil servants, Green Party 
politicians, and specialists working on climate-related issues in each city to 
identify activist groups who had been vocal on adaptation. While this 
approach helped identify groups with some focus on adaptation, these inter-
views mostly indicated limited social movement engagement with topics 
beyond mitigation (except in Antwerp, see below). To add entry points, 
I also contacted and interviewed members from several well-known CCM 
groups like XR and Friends of the Earth. Again, interviewees could only 
indicate groups with some focus on adaptation, who were in turn contacted 
and, if possible, interviewed.
While trying to cast a broad net, this selection procedure ultimately 
yielded a sample representing the typical socio-economic bias of environ-
mental movements (Staggenborg 2020): Interviewees tended to be highly 
educated and white, but diverse in age and gender. It is possible that 
I overlooked relevant groups representing different demographics (such as 
described in studies of American environmental justice movements) because 
they formed separate networks, or worked on climate-relevant topics using 
different framings. Furthermore, through this approach, I did not encounter 
‘collapsologist’ groups described in earlier studies on postapocalyptic envir-
onmentalism (Cassegård and Thörn 2018). Otherwise, I was able to obtain 
a broad overview of each city’s CCM scene through eleven interviews in 
Antwerp, eleven in Bristol, ten in Malmö, eight in Hamburg and six in 
Manchester. Between 2017 and 2020, I conducted 46 interviews of typically 
one to one-and-a-half hours, and all but one were recorded and transcribed. 
The appendix provides an overview of organizations covered in each city, as 
well as the interview numbers that the quotes below refer to.
I used a semi-structured funnelling approach (Brinkmann and Kvale 
2015) to interview activists, loosely following a topic list that addressed, 
first, how activists perceived the climate crisis and the kind of action that 
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requires, which in most cases, revealed serious doubts that dangerous climate 
change could still be prevented. We then discussed if and how their strategies 
responded to this diagnosis, including whether the interviewee and their 
group perceived a need to complement a focus on mitigation (which almost 
all interviewed groups had) with a focus on adaptation.
In addition, I carried out ethnographic observations to get a better under-
standing of the everyday processes through which climate activists make 
sense of and respond to the climate crisis. Within the scope of this project, it 
was possible to study one organization in detail: a Bristolian grassroots 
organization, referred to under the pseudonym ‘Carbon Free’, which aims 
to accelerate the transition to zero carbon in the wider Bristol region. From 
my interviews, it had become clear that Carbon Free had ongoing internal 
debates regarding the severity of the climate crisis and its strategic implica-
tions, thus allowing me to observe (post)apocalyptic environmentalism in 
action. For four weeks in October 2019, and one week in January 2020, 
I observed all meetings and activities of the group to gain an insider per-
spective. While these observations informed the analysis, I only have space to 
cover some of its details.
Combined, these data offer an overview of climate activists’ views of, and 
(lack of) engagement with, postapocalyptic environmentalism across five 
European cities, providing an optimal basis for exploring this under- 
researched topic. In a first step, I analysed data based on summaries of 
interviews and observations that were made immediately after data collec-
tion. I could thereby develop an initial overview of key findings. In a second 
step, I coded to verify initial interpretations through a more in-depth analy-
sis. Following Lichterman (2002), I applied a combination of open and closed 
thematic coding (using NVivo software). Most themes, such as perceptions 
of the severity of the climate crisis or the need for activism on mitigation or 
adaption, were derived from theory and applied to the data through closed 
coding. Additionally, some themes, such as the importance of limited 
resources, emerged inductively from the empirical material, and were then 
systematically applied through open coding. Following the principles of 
‘meaning coding’ (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015), my aim was not to count 
the (co-)occurrence of specific themes, but to organize the large amount of 
data around core themes and to enable interpretations of manageable sub-
sections of the data in light of the main research questions.
The nature and place of (post)apocalyptic environmentalism in 
climate activism
Most activists included in this study combined apocalyptic and postapoca-
lyptic views of climate change. Some for instance subscribed to the post-
apocalyptic notion that major disruptions were already here or underway – 
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referring often to the exceptionally warm and dry European summer of 
2018 – but also believed that some impacts could still be prevented:
It’s like we’re really starting to feel the consequences. Even in Sweden. [. . .] The 
extinction we talk about has already begun. [. . .] Often we talk about climate 
change as something [. . .] later. But it’s already happening. It’s just that it will 
get worse. (Interview 34, XR, Malmö, 2019)
While typically still perceiving a window of opportunity to avert some 
impacts of climate change, activists often felt that humanity was unlikely 
to catch that window. This ambiguity was captured by one interviewee 
saying:
Well, of course, sometimes there are reports it says it’s already too late. But 
many reports say there is a chance that we still have these 10 years. And it’s 
kind of like, yeah, we are all aware that there is no guarantee that this will work. 
Either it might fail or it’s already too late. (Interview 28, XR, Hamburg, 2019)
Some activists explained that it differed from time to time how pessimistic 
they were about this, but rather than lingering on concrete disruptions down 
the line, they expressed an unwavering commitment to action:
It changes for me at different times. I think, fundamentally, I really struggle 
with the whole thing, which is, we want to get to zero carbon by 2030. I believe 
that is necessary. I believe it is not going to happen. And I’m committing 
myself to this work to try and make it happen, which I do think is possible. 
(Interview 17, Carbon Free, Bristol, 2020)
Some days I think it’s too late. [. . .] It’s not permanent. But I am convinced you 
can always try to do something. [. . .] I guess that’s what everybody thinks in 
this group. (Interview 33, Friends of the Earth, Malmö, 2019)
Yet even when ‘trying to do something’, the ambiguity between apocalyptic 
and postapocalyptic views persisted. In Carbon Free, I observed activists who 
publicly promoted mitigation, but privately expressed strong doubts about 
the achievability of that goal, mentioning for instance that achieving the 
IPCC’s 10-year window of opportunity to avert dangerous climate change 
was ‘hopelessly unrealistic’ (Interview 20, Carbon Free, Bristol, 2020).
Notably, activists often mentioned that while they worried at a personal 
level, their groups rarely explicitly discussed climate scenarios. Limited 
meeting time was typically taken up with arranging the practicalities of 
upcoming events. While some interviewees regretted this, others believed 
their groups were productive, precisely because they did not have to expli-
citly discuss climate scenarios:
The nice thing is that [. . .] we don’t have to talk about how big the issue is and 
that we’re facing a climate crisis. This is basically the premise that we’re all here 
on and [. . .] this is really a good foundation for working together. (Interview 
28, XR, Hamburg, 2019)
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In sum, postapocalyptic environmentalism loomed large among activists in 
the scenes I studied, but remained largely unspoken and did not replace 
apocalyptic narratives. Activists oscillated between both perspectives, or 
acknowledged both preventable and avoidable disruptions. Postapocalyptic 
diagnoses were often shallow and abstract, taking the form of an underlying 
worry rather than an explicit discussion about specific threats or their 
implications, and they were often accompanied by a combative refusal to 
give up. A closer examination of the complicated relation between (post) 
apocalyptic diagnoses and strategizing will further expand our understand-
ing of their nature and place in climate activism.
Strategic continuity in response to (post)apocalyptic 
environmentalism
Refusing to give up, most groups did not significantly change their goals and 
remained largely focused on mitigation. For instance, much of the campaign-
ing that interviewees were involved in during the period of data collection 
was under the banners of FFF and XR. These campaigns make broad 
demands such as ‘declare a climate emergency’ and ‘listen to the science,’ 
but their more specific demands are clearly focused on mitigation. XR for 
instance demands that ‘Government must act now to halt biodiversity loss 
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2025,’1 and FFF 
demands to ‘Keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C’.2 Most other 
campaigns that groups were active in also focused on mitigation, such as 
Carbon Free’s campaign to get its region to zero carbon by 2030.
So, what enabled this continued focus on mitigation, despite widespread 
pessimism regarding its achievability? The main mechanism that I found to 
enable this was to keep postapocalyptic discussions out of spaces for strate-
gizing. For instance, within some XR groups, discussions about how bad 
climate change would likely get, were relegated to therapeutic or informal 
spaces where activists could share hopelessness and other emotions, in turn 
enabling themselves to continue their mitigation-oriented activism. Specific 
motivational frames were in place to deal with this contradiction between 
mitigation-oriented strategies and postapocalyptic sentiments. One XR 
Malmö interviewee indicated that:
Within extinction rebellion it is talked about that (. . .) we need to be brave, like 
we need to act even if we don’t know if we will succeed. (Interview 35, XR, 
Malmö, 2019)
Likewise, a Manchester-based activist argued that:
It might be a delusion that we’re operating under, but (. . .) it’s sort of essential 
in order to be able to (. . .) continue to do what you do because (. . .) once you 
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accept that something is too late, then you just fuck it off, don’t you really? 
(Interview 44, Community Retrofit Organization, Manchester, 2017)
Remaining engaged in mitigation-oriented activism was therefore seen as 
necessary and self-perpetuating: As long as people are campaigning, and see 
others around them doing the same, it remains possible to imagine a way out. 
This was reflected by others who indicated that they and the people around 
them became active in climate activism precisely to overcome the feeling of 
desperation they felt when ‘passively’ consuming climate news. Therefore, 
they felt that it would undermine their primary motivation if they were to 
consider desperate scenarios or the need to adapt:
I guess it’s very simple. If you’re active, if you’re doing something, and you’re 
into it then you’re not sitting looking at the figures, the bad, the black horizon. 
Because you are doing something. So maybe it’s a way of protecting myself 
from that. (Interview 33, Friends of the Earth, Malmö, 2019)
Thus, while Cassegård and Thörn (2018) described how some activists can 
find hope in postapocalyptic narratives, my findings suggest that others 
actively marginalized such narratives to stay motivated. Yet in doing so, 
they foreclosed discussions of the potential need for, and meaning of, 
strategic responses to postapocalyptic scenarios, including through engage-
ment with questions of adaptation.
Most agreed that, considering the lack of progress on mitigation, adaptation 
was becoming an increasingly important challenge for society. However, 
adaptation was typically not considered as an additional or alternative goal. 
Acknowledgement of the contentious nature of adaptation or its justice 
implications was rare. Instead, many climate activists continued to view 
adaptation as a defeatist and techno-optimistic excuse for inaction:
There is this sort of iron curtain between the green tech way of looking at the 
future that we’re going to adapt our way out of the situation by technology and 
sort of not really mitigating stuff in any powerful way. And the other way is the 
way of the environmental movement, I would say, which is really focused on 
mitigation and very sceptical about any technological solutions. (Interview 40, 
Fossil Free, Malmö, 2019)
Others believed adaptation should be left to governments and specialists to 
take care of. Particularly in Sweden, it was felt that ‘we are still in a country 
that still trusts that the government will take care of us’ (Interview 37, 
Naturskyddsföreningen, Malmö, 2019). Occasionally, interviewees expressed 
a lack of confidence in government capacity to implement sufficient adapta-
tion measures. Some even agreed that adaptation is a political issue that 
would benefit from the involvement of CCMs. Yet beyond that, critical 
perceptions remained limited and abstract. Many activists did not see 
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a particular reason why or how their groups should get involved with the 
politics of adaptation.
Others did indicate that they were finding more room to discuss post-
apocalyptic views. For instance, they experienced that defeatist and hopeless 
connotations around adaptation were disappearing in their respective move-
ment scenes, thereby creating more space to address this topic. Moreover, 
activists who had become accustomed to postapocalyptic notions through 
long-time engagement had gradually come around to the idea that adapta-
tion was an important topic – even for CCMs. Some believed this was a wider 
trend, induced through disappointments like the failed 2009 Copenhagen 
climate summit:
It’s become more about the adaptation thing. [. . .] For myself – and I have 
a sense that it’s a motivating factor for quite a lot of people in the world 
I inhabit in this movement – is that people got very motivated about climate in 
the late 90s, early noughties, and it felt quite depressing and disempowering 
very quickly – Copenhagen being the main spike in that. (Interview 13, 
Community Food Organization, Bristol, 2019)
However, while some thereby found space to consider the relevance of 
focusing on adaptation in general terms, they were often still inclined to 
prioritize mitigation. For instance, while some applied a local justice per-
spective that underlined the importance of local adaptation politics, this 
perspective could simultaneously be outweighed by a global justice perspec-
tive that foregrounded mitigation. A Manchester-based activist who indi-
cated that she was ‘really interested personally in bringing more of that [. . .] 
very community-based adaptation’ into their group said that:
Although actually, if you take a wider view at climate change, the point of 
working on reducing carbon emissions fits into issues around justice, because 
really, [. . .] the climate change effects are going to be unjust. (Interview 42, 
Community Retrofit Organization, Manchester, 2017)
While adaptation was often described as something that could be done at 
a later moment, the window of opportunity for mitigation was seen as 
rapidly closing, even if only to make the difference between more and less 
catastrophic outcomes:
We definitely have to prepare for a different future. Many of us are thinking 
about that. And I heard people talking about like making an eco self- 
sustaining community. And yes, I could also imagine that. But I think it’s 
a matter of priority for now. We only have 10 years and this one to three next 
years are kind of like crucial. So in preparing for a future which will maybe 
be there in 20, 30, 40 years, that’s like a long time. (Interview 28, XR, 
Hamburg, 2019).
This prioritization of mitigation over adaptation in a context of limited 
resources meant that many activists simply had not had the time or capacity 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 13
to discuss in depth the state of the climate crisis, its consequences, and the 
kinds of responses that required. Activists from Antwerp explained that:
Indeed, it gives a bit of a sense of giving up if you are working on adaptation, 
but we are already at 0.8 degrees, so we have to adapt and we have to campaign 
on that. But there’s a lot to do and people can’t do everything. We have 
a limited capacity. (Interview 11, Climaxi, Antwerp, 2019).
Finally, some of those most inclined to focus on adaptation indicated that it 
is not at all clear at this stage what would need to happen more specifically, 
because the nature of local threats and potential injustices was still unclear. 
By contrast, mitigation was seen as a clear task, including any measure to 
cut back greenhouse gas emissions. A Bristol-based activist linked the 
difficulty of imagining what adaptation should entail to the emotional 
challenges of the uncertainty implied by working with a postapocalyptic 
perspective:
At times when I feel more the pessimistic side of it (. . .) I think we should all do 
something like the work that reconnects and feel the reality of what’s happen-
ing and act from that place. But it’s very difficult to understand what that 
action would be. And I think myself, I have a desire to avoid feeling the despair 
of what I think is really going to happen and to avoid that by doing action [. . .]. 
And I see that in other people as well. (Interview 17, Carbon Free, Bristol, 
2020)
Mitigation, in other words, spells out a much clearer path for action than its 
alternatives, rendering it the preferred goal – even if its achievability is in 
doubt.
The exceptions: climate adaptation as a response to 
postapocalyptic narratives
While keeping mitigation central, some of the activists willing to more 
openly consider postapocalyptic scenarios occasionally found room to incor-
porate those views into their strategizing – though often only implicitly. In 
this section, I will discuss these exceptions, which can all be broadly defined 
as forms of adaptation to (anticipated) impacts of climate change.
Most commonly, activists considered the relevance of the work they were 
already doing in light of preparing for climate impacts. For instance, some 
involved in local food and energy projects saw what they were doing not just 
as developing more sustainable ways to produce, but also as adapting to the 
growing risk of disruptions in global supply chains. A Bristol-based activist 
argued that:
My experience of like trying to develop a locally connected agro-ecological 
farm is more to do with adapting to climate change really than trying to stop it. 
(Interview 13, Community Food Organization, Bristol, 2019)
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Some activists indicated that their mitigation-oriented activities had become 
informed by preparing for postapocalyptic scenarios by promoting social 
relations that would protect society and especially vulnerable groups in the 
face of climate disruptions. By organizing collective action, and by doing so 
in an inclusive way, they hoped they would strengthen social capital, bring 
diverse groups together, and promote equality, so that ‘society will respond 
to the consequences of climate change with solidarity instead of fascism’ 
(Ethnographic observation 2020, Carbon Free).
I found that activist groups in Antwerp engaged with adaptation most 
extensively. This was largely due to the fact that the municipality of Antwerp 
had in recent years involved various civil society groups in ‘co-creating’ local 
adaptation through their Stadslab [city lab] 2050 project to involve civil 
society in imagining the city of the future. The municipality had decided 
that co-creation could democratize adaptation as well as mobilize private 
property owners to share the costs of adaptation. While later expanding to 
other neighbourhoods, the municipality decided to initially work mainly 
with the neighbourhood of Sint-Andries, because of its large share of pri-
vately owned homes and its reputation for community involvement with 
environmental issues. In particular, a local chapter of Transition Towns, 
which had long worked based on the premise that ‘we are not going to wait 
for governments’ to act on climate change and who had gradually shifted 
focus to ‘absorbing the shocks that are inevitably coming as a community’ 
(Interview 6, Klimaatrobuust Sint-Andries, Antwerp, 2019), was eager to co- 
create adaptive measures. With the support of the municipality and under 
the new banner of ‘Klimaatrobuust [climate-robust] Sint-Andries’, they 
began, among other things, to green the neighbourhood and introduce soft 
surfaces to increase its ability to literally absorb climate-induced heat and 
flooding. The combination of a demand and supply of participation thus 
boosted civil society engagement with adaptation as a response to a growing 
perception that major climate disruptions could no longer be prevented.
However, this approach was also criticized. For instance, a campaign 
called Ringland, which opposed plans to restructure Antwerp’s ring road, 
was interpreted by one core organizer as a direct critique of the city’s 
adaptation policies. The group advocated building a tunnel rather than the 
municipality’s preferred above-ground solution. The tunnel, according to the 
organizer, would not only improve the city’s air quality, but also open up 
a large space for a green park-ring that would act as a sponge for climate- 
induced flooding and urban heating. This argument was formulated in 
a direct critique to the city’s dominant co-creation approach:
So here and there, a piece of green is created in the city, but like that we will still 
be working for another 100 or 200 years to address the heat island problem of 
the city of Antwerp. If you want to do something about the heat island of the 
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city, you need something else. You need a measure that really makes 
a difference. That is a disruptive measure and Ringland was such 
a disruptive possibility that has been dragged through the mud. (Interview 7, 
Ringland, Antwerp, 2019)
Thus, a main argument for Ringland was a concern about the scale and speed 
of current adaptation interventions, as well as their social justice implica-
tions. After all, co-creation would mainly benefit those privileged commu-
nities in possession of the resources needed to participate. Nonetheless, 
adaptation was excluded from the campaign’s public framing, which 
remained focused on the publicly salient issue of air quality.
In Hamburg, local groups also campaigned around infrastructure in light 
of adaptation. A longstanding debate existed around the development of the 
Elbe River, which provides the entry to Hamburg’s inland sea-harbour. 
While the city wanted to deepen it to allow bigger ships to come in, some 
campaigners argued that this could increase tides and undermine the 
strength of dikes, thus increasing flood risks. While some groups therefore 
saw this debate as adaptation-related, others preferred to frame the conflict 
in terms of nature conservation and economic growth, and adaptation did 
not become central to public campaigning.
Discussion
So, what do these findings tell us about the place of postapocalyptic envir-
onmentalism in CCMs and its strategic implications? Whilst Cassegård and 
Thörn (2018) showed that some groups specifically organize around 
a postapocalyptic narrative, my analysis of a more general cross-section of 
European climate groups clearly challenges the notion that postapocalyptic 
narratives replace apocalyptic narratives, or that their spread has necessarily 
inspired a shift in goals and strategies. While many interviewees at least 
privately shared parts of a postapocalyptic narrative, and while some were 
even prepared to consider whether this should have implications for move-
ment goals, ultimately this rarely affected their strategizing. Contrary to 
a logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1998), activists rarely shifted 
focus to dealing with the effects of climate change that they had come to 
see as unavoidable. Indeed, staying focused on mitigation was sometimes an 
unreflexive response to a lack of resources that restricted groups to the 
repetition of well-known repertoires of action, thus suggesting that strategic 
continuity partially emerges from a logic of habit (Hopf, 2010).
However, a more encompassing explanation for why mitigation-oriented 
responses remained prioritized in the distribution of scarce resources is 
provided by the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998). I found 
that strategic continuity for many presented the only ‘appropriate’ option. 
This is due in particular to the roles of emotions and identity. I found that 
16 J. DE MOOR
many activists felt an emotional need to stay optimistically focused on the 
possibility of meaningful mitigation, thus underlining the logic of affect and 
Markwica's (2018) observation that hope, rather than fear, leads to persis-
tence. In turn, being engaged in mitigation-oriented activism rekindled hope 
for a way out. These emotional responses were not strictly individual, instead 
being intertwined with the logic of appropriateness through feeling rules 
(Kleres and Wettergren 2017) that present norms about correct ways of 
dealing with emotions. This process clearly links emotions with the repro-
duction of climate activists’ collective identities as based in a continued fight 
for mitigation, even if things look bleak. The need to continue the focus on 
mitigation was for some activists related to a need for a clear picture of the 
kinds of action and outcomes that were required. Clarity was experienced as 
motivating and was contrasted to uncertainty about what action beyond 
mitigation would entail. Shifting from an apocalyptic to a postapocalyptic 
narrative, in short, carried the emotional challenge of hopelessness and a loss 
of identity. This narrative shift therefore almost never presented a ‘wellspring 
of a postapocalyptic politics in which activism arises as a response to loss’ 
(Cassegård and Thörn 2018, p. 563). While I have also discussed exceptional 
efforts to translate postapocalyptic narratives into a focus on adaptation, 
these efforts mostly presented cautious add-ons to a continued commitment 
to mitigation.
In short, although postapocalyptic environmentalism appears to be an 
increasingly important undercurrent in the CCM scenes that I have studied, 
a logic of appropriateness, and its interaction with a logic of affect, clearly 
keeps this narrative from shaping strategizing. Until CCMs develop narra-
tives that change this sense of appropriateness, this may be unlikely to 
change. I stress the logic of appropriateness not to dismiss these groups as 
irrational, naïve, or ineffective. There are clear, viable reasons to minimize 
global warming, even if the difference that can be made only concerns the 
extent of the coming apocalypse (a way of thinking many activists seem to 
follow). It is in line with a logic of consequences to develop narratives that 
support that work. As others have noted before, the logics of consequences, 
appropriateness, habit, and affect are ideal types that in reality are inter-
twined (Markwica 2018).
Conclusion
In this paper, I explored how climate activists in five north-western 
European cities relate to the idea of apocalyptic and postapocalyptic envir-
onmentalism, and how the presumed spread of postapocalyptic environ-
mentalism has affected the goals and strategies in each of them. I found 
that whilst postapocalyptic environmentalism has spread widely in these 
scenes as a diagnosis of climate change, it has complemented rather than 
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replaced apocalyptic narratives. Within many groups, both apocalyptic and 
postapocalyptic narratives were present, with each having their own func-
tion or place. Postapocalyptic narratives have not (so far) produced sig-
nificant shifts in movement goals and strategies, for instance towards 
a focus on adaptation to (expected) catastrophic impacts; they were often 
kept out of strategizing, to prevent ‘dark thoughts’ from demotivating 
activists, and enabling continuing work on mitigation, which in turn 
rekindled hopes that the apocalypse could still be averted. Even where 
activists were more inclined to consider activism beyond mitigation, they 
tended to prioritize mitigation as providing a more urgent and clear call for 
action.
The continued focus on mitigation despite postapocalyptic narratives is 
partly in line with the logic of consequences, since mitigation is still seen as 
a valid goal, if only to avoid the most catastrophic scenarios. However, 
additional explanations are clearly needed. The logic of habits accounts for 
the ways in which resource constraints limit CCM groups from engaging in 
deep strategic reflections, instead reproducing their traditional focus on 
mitigation. Fundamentally, the reason why mitigation remains prioritized 
should be seen as resulting from a logic of appropriateness, by which 
decentring mitigation in favour of more postapocalyptically informed goals 
is seen as inappropriate. This perceived inappropriateness is in part due to 
a logic of affect by which many still see optimistic hope as a precondition for 
action. Still, it is important to emphasize the exceptions. I have found clear 
variations in the way individuals and groups respond to (post)apocalyptic 
narratives, with some going much further than others in exploring new goals 
like adaptation. The example of Antwerp shows most clearly that contextual 
variations can matter as well: City-level policies can effectively increase civic 
engagement with climate adaptation, but may rely on pre-existing social or 
material capital and may exclude communities that lack resources necessary 
to participate in co-creation (Mees et al. 2017).
By keeping postapocalyptic narratives out of strategizing, and instead 
perpetuating apocalyptic narratives in strategic spaces, many CCM groups 
are able to keep their focus on mitigation unchallenged by the growing sense 
that it might be too late to avert catastrophic climate change. While this 
usefully enables a continued and even escalating global effort to avoid some 
of the worst climate change scenarios, it also limits important discussions 
about the strategic implications of present or unavoidable climate disrup-
tions. This topic appears to remain the exclusive terrain of dedicated ‘col-
lapsologists’ (Cassegård and Thörn 2018). Particularly given the climate 
justice implications associated with climate adaptation, there is a need for 
‘mainstream’ climate activism to find ways to engage with these issues as well 
and to overcome the sense that it is not sufficiently clear what a shift away 
from mitigation could entail.
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Appendix
# Date Place Duration (minutes)
Organization (small organizations are 
anonymized; max. 1 affiliation indicated to 
prevent identification through cross- 
referencing)
Interviews Antwerp
1 12 October 2018 Online 81 Community participation organization
2 3 December 2018 Online 77 City of Antwerp
3 4 April 2019 Antwerp 92 Community participation organization
4 4 April 2019 Antwerp 74 City of Antwerp
5 4 April 2019 Antwerp 113 Local environmental movement 
organization
6 4 April 2019 Antwerp 94 Klimaatrobuust Sint-Andries
7 5 April 2019 Antwerp 67 Local environmental movement 
organization
8 5 April 2019 Antwerp 60 Environmental neighborhood organization
9 5 April 2019 Antwerp 89 Local environmental movement 
organization
10 8 April 2019 Antwerp 67 Local environmental movement 
organization
11 28 June 2019 Online 78 Climaxi (two interviewees)
Interviews Bristol
12 20 February 2019 Online 65 Green Party
13 10 April 2019 Bristol 49 Community food organization
14 10 April 2019 Bristol 62 Local environmental organizations, 
academic expert interview
15 11 April 2019 Bristol 86 Carbon Free
16 14 January 2020 Bristol 83 Carbon Free
17 15 January 2020 Bristol 71 Carbon Free
(Continued)
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# Date Place Duration (minutes) Organization (small organizations are 
anonymized; max. 1 affiliation indicated to 
prevent identification through cross- 
referencing)
18 16 January 2020 Bristol ~25 (not recorded) Extinction Rebellion
19 15 January 2020 Bristol 69 Carbon Free
20 20 February 2020 Online 73 Carbon Free
21 25 February 2020 Online 51 Reclaim the Power
22 17 March 2020 Online 28 Community organization
# Date Place Duration (minutes) Organization (small organizations are 
anonymized; max. 1 affiliation to 
prevent cross-referencing)
Interviews Hamburg
23 4 January 2019 Online 28 Local government consultant
24 14 January 2019 Online 44 Academic specialist interview
25 19 February 2019 Online 62 Academic specialist interview
26 22 February 2019 Online 22 Environmental movement organization
27 31 March 2019 Hamburg 173 Environmental neighborhood organization
28 1 April 2019 Hamburg 93 Extinction Rebellion
29 1 April 2019 Hamburg 152 Environmental movement organization
30 31 July 2019 Online 71 City of Hamburg
Interviews Malmö
31 2 January 2019 Online 17 Friends of the Earth
32 1 February 2019 Online 24 Local environmental movement 
organization
33 27 March 2019 Malmö 78 Friends of the Earth (follow up)
34 27 March 2019 Malmö 93 Extinction Rebellion
35 28 March 2019 Malmö 88 Extinction Rebellion
36 28 March 2019 Malmö 66 Green Party
37 29 March 2019 Malmö 74 Naturskyddsföreningen
38 29 March 2019 Malmö 47 City of Malmö
39 29 March 2019 Malmö 34 Environmental neighborhood organization
40 27 June 2019 Online 55 Fossil Free
Interviews Manchester
41 12 April 2017 Manchester 93 Community food organization
42 13 April 2017 Manchester 69 Community retrofit organization
43 20 April 2017 Manchester 80 Community retrofit organization
44 28 April 2017 Manchester 101 Community retrofit organization
45 5 May 2017 Manchester 120 Community food organization
46 25 June 2017 Manchester 87 Community food organization
22 J. DE MOOR
